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SEPTEMBER, 1977 GERASIB:OS SANTAS 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE
The Form of the Good in Plato's Republicl 
, "Looking into the orb of light he [Plato J sees nothing, but 
he is warmed and elevated." -- Jowett 
No writer has made for the concept of goodness loftier claims than 
Plato makes for the Form of the Good in the middle books of the Republic. 
We are told that without knowledge of the Form of the Good we cannot know that 
anything else is good, a�d that without knowledge of this Form all other know­
ledge would be of no benefit to us (505A-506B). Further, the Form of the 
, Good is "the cause" of truth and know�dge. Further yet, the objects of know­
ledge receive "their being and essence" from the Form of the Good though it is 
not essence "but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power. 11 
(509AB) As if this intriguing views were not paradoxical enough,· Plato has 
Socrates suggest that even the foundations of mathematics are insecure unless 
we have knowledge of the Good: the beginnings of geometry and arithmetic are 
hypc.,theses, not known until the soul can "ascent" from them to the Form of the 
Good and "descent" back from it to them. (509B-51 1C) 
These dark sayings are'not inciden"tal to Plato's philosophy. On the 
contrary they are the centerpiece of canonical Platonism, Plato's ethics, 
epistemology, and metaphysics of the middle period. The Form of the Good is 
given the privileged position: it is prior, ethically, epistemologically, and 
ontologically, to everything else in Plato's universe. Nor is this view con­
fined to the Republic. I believe that an excellent case can be made out that 
the teleological explanation of the Phaedo (pp 97-99) and the "creation" of 
the physical _universe in the Timaeus (pp. 28-35) presuppose this priority of 
the Form of the 'Good. 
Why did Plato assign such a supreme position to the Form of the Good? 
What conception of goodness dld he have which allowed. him to think of the Form 
of the Good not only as the final cause of everything we do but-also "the cause" 
of the knowability and even of the very being.of his favorite entities, the 
Forms? And what connection did he see between the Form of the Good and mathe­
matics? 
As might well be expected, a considerable body of literature has been 
built around the relevant passages. It would take a long book to discuss ade­
quately the interpretations put forward in this century alone. Yet is is no 
hyperbole to say that we have .. no satisfactory or widely accepted answers to 
our questions. A group of earlier writers, very substantial Platonic scholars 
indeed, discussed the relevent texts at length, but.unfortunately they did 
not have the benefit of the excellent discussions of Plato's metaphsyics that 
have taken place in the last quarter century. 2 A second group of very recent 
writers that have discussed our texts, acute philosophers indeed, do not seem 
J 
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to me to have paid close enough attention to Plato's texts, and, probably as a 
result, their discussions do not illuminate a great deal what Plato says.3 
In this paper I propose to re-examine closely what Plato actually says with the 
hope of making some progress: I think it can be shown that what Plato says 
about the Form of the Good is coherent and coheres well with what is now known 
of his metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. I am heavily indebted to a 
third group of writers who, so far as I know, have not written directly on 
our passages but who have thrown a flood of light on Plato's thought and have 
made distinctions of direct relevance to the privileged position of the Form 
of the Good.4 
I divide Plato's discussion into three rounds, or, as they may well 
b� called, three waves of paradox, and discuss each in turn. 
I 
The First Round: Ethics, Politics, and the Form of the Good 
Plato's discussion of the Form of the Good occurs in a section of 
Book VI which is concerned with the education of the rulers (SOOff). We are 
told that it is not sufficient for the rulers to learn what justice, temper­
ance, courage, and wisdom are, according to the definitions established in 
Book IV. These definitions do not provide a sufficient and exact understanding 
of these virtues. There is something greater than these virtues, and there is 
a "longer way".to understanding these things, a way that culminates in "the 
greatest study": 
Gl The greatest study is the study of the Form of the Good, 
by participation in which just things and all the rest 
become useful and beneficial. (SOSA) 
G2 If we do not know the·Form of the Good, then even if without 
such knowledge we know everything else, it (the knowledge of 
everything else) would be of no benefit to us, just as no 
possession would be (of benefit) without possession of the 
Good. (SOSAB) 
GJ If we know all things without knowing the Good, (this would 
be of no benefit because) we would not know (thap anything 
(is) beautiful and good. (SOSB) 
Next Plato rejects two hypotheses concerning the nature of the Good: (a) 
The good is knowledge, and (b) the Good is pleasure. The first hypothesis 
is rejected on the ground that those who hold it are unable to answer the 
question "Knowledge of what?" except by saying "Knowledge of the Good", thus 
ending up with the circular and uninformative definition that the Good is 
knowledge of the Good. The second hypothesis is rejected on the ground that 
those who hold it admit that there are bad pleasures, and are thus compelled 
l----
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to admit that the same things (bad pleasures) are both good and bad (presu­
mably a contradiction). Thus: 
G4 The Good is not (identical with) knowledge or pleasure. 
(505BCD) 
Plato concludes this round by asserting two propositions about good things and 
the Good and by emphasizing the importance of knowledge of the Good for the 
rulers: 
GS Many people prefer what appears to be just and honorable 
but is not, but no one prefers to pursue or possess what 
appears good but is not. (505DE)5 
G6 The Good every soul .pursues and does everything for its sake 
divining what it is and yet baffled and not having an adequate 
apprehension of its nature nor a stable opinion about it as 
it has about other things, and because of this failing to 
have any benefit from other things. (505E) 
G7 Our constitution will not be perfectly ordered unless the 
1 rulers know how just and honorable things are good and they 
will not know this unless they know the Good. (506AB) 
This round is the least paradoxical of the three and the easiest 
to understand in the general setting of Plato's theory of Forms and his ethics. 
The main metaphysical and epistemological assertions that Plato makes here 
about the Form of the Good are simply instances of his general metaphysics and 
epistemology. Thus the second part of G1 is simply an instance of a general 
proposition that Plato holds, namely: 
Fl It is by virtue of participation in the Form F-ness or 
the F that anything which is F is F .6 
And G3 is an instance of the general epistemological proposition that goes 
together with the theory of Forms, namely: 
F2 If we do not know F-ness or the F, we do not know that any­
thing is F.7 
Thus G3 and the second part of Gl do not assign to the Form of the Good any 
privileged position over other Forms. On the other hand, the first part of 
Gl (and perhaps G2 and G7) does assign to the study of the Good a privileged 
position over all otehr studies and to the knowledge of the Good over all 
other knowledge. But this privileged position, so far, can be accounted for 
and understood by reference to G6, another standard Socratic and Platonic 
ethical view. If all our actions, pursuits, and undertakings are for the 
sake of the Good, then knowledge of the Good would indeed seem to be the most 
important knowledge we can have: for without it we would never know that 
anything for the sake of which we did anything else was good (by G3). We would 
I� 
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be like archers who lived for the sake of hitting their targets bout could 
never see them clearly and, what is worse, could never know whether what they 
hit were their targets! Can we imagine anything more frustrating or less 
satisfying? Had Plato's assertions about the Good stope<l here, his position 
would have been only mildly paradoxical and not all that different from 
Aristotle's; and 'the paradox and the difference would derive from his appli­
cation of Fl and F2 to the case of goodness. We might say that the conjunc­
tion of Gl, G3 and G6 assigns an ethical or practical priority to the study of 
the Good, and this priority might well have been thought sufficient for the 
paradox of the Philosopher-King. 
II 
The Second Round: The Epistemological and Ontological Priority of 
the Form of the Good 
The second round is a wave of paradox indeed: Plato seems to assign 
to the Form of the Good an ontological and epistemological priority over all 
other Forms. The round (506B-509C) begins when Socrates is challenged to 
say what the Form of the Good is, if it is not knowledge or pleasure. Socrates 
implies that he does not know what the Form of the Good is, and when asked to 
give at least his opinion he proposes to let go for the moment the question 
about, the nature of the Good and to speak of "the offspring of the Good which 
is most like it." He now prepares the ground for the simile of the Sun by 
first making the usual Platonic distinction between good things and beautiful 
thi�gs, objects of vision but not thought, on the one hand, and the Good 
itself and the Beautiful itself, objects of thought but not vision, on, the 
other. In the case of vision and visible things a man may have the power of 
vision and a thing may be visible but there may be no actual vision (seeing) 
if a third element is not present, namely, light which is provided by the 
chief of the heavenly divinities, the Sun, "whose light makes the faculty 
of sight see best and visible things to be seen." (508A) Socrates now states 
and elaborates the simile as follows: 
G8 As the Good is in the intelligible region to reason 
and to the objects of reason, so is the Sun in the visible 
world to vision and the objects of vision. (508C) 
G9 The Sun (by its light) gives the objects of sight their 
visibility and the faculty of sight its vision; similarly, the 
Form of, the Good gives the objects of reason their truth and 
to reason its knowledge of them. (508B, 508DE) 
GlO The Sun is the cause of light and vision, and light and vision 
are sunlike but not identical with the Sun; similarly, the 
Form of the Good is the cause of truth and knowledge, and 
truth and knowledge are like the Form of the Good but they are 
not identical with it. (509A) 
-5-
Gll The Sun not only furntshes the visibles the power of visibility 
but also provides for their generation and growth and nurture, 
though it is not itself generation; similarly, the objects of 
knowledge receive not only their being known from the presence 
of the Good, but also their being and essence (reality) comes 
from it, though the Good, is not essence but st .ill transcends 
essence in dignity and surpassing �ower. (509B, Shorey tr.) 
In Shorey's translati9n, Plato's next two lines read: 
And Glaucon very ludicrously said, "Heaven save us, hyperbole 
can no further go." 
As Socrates' reluctance and Glaucon's response indicate, the second 
round is far more difficult to understand and interpret than the first. Let us 
start by distinguishing sharply between the two rounds. The first round deals 
with relations between the Form of the Good and anything that is good whether a 
Form or a sensible thing. But the second round deals with relations between the 
Form of the Good and Forms only: between the Form of the Good and objects of know­
ledge or thought, i.e., Forms. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that it is the 
attributes of the Forms qua Forms or their ideal attributes that is being ex­
plained or accounted for by reference to the Form of the Good; not their proper 
attributes, i.e., the attributes that each Form has by virtue of being the particular 
Form it is. 8 This is an important clue in understanding and interpreting the 
second round, and we shall return to it shortly. The second importnat difference 
between the two rounds is that while the first round assigns an ethical or prac­
tical priority to the study of the Form of the Good over every other study, the 
second round assigns ontological and epistemological priorities to the Form of 
the Good over every other Form. And it is precisely these latter priorities 
that have to be understood. 
Essentially, the second round contains three distinct but related 
assertions: (1) The Form of the Good is "the cause" of the knowability of the 
Forms; (2) the Form of the Good is "the cause" of reason's actually knowing the 
Forms; and (3) the Form of the Good is "the cause" of the "being and essence 
_(reality) 11 of the Forms. Let us consider (1) and (3) together. We have a chance, 
I think, to understand these two assertions if we can answer the following three 
questions: Ql What constitutes the being and essence of the Forms? Q2 What is 
the relation between the being and essence of the Forms and their knowability? 
Q3 Given an answer to Ql, how �an we understand the Form of the Good so as to make 
sense of Plato's view that it is "the cause·", in some appropriate Plstonic sense 
of "cause", of the being and essence of the Forms? 
The context of th·e second round, the distinction between ideal an'd 
proper attributes, and Professor Vlastos' recent studies of Plato's doctrine 
of degrees of reality9 make it possible, I think, to give a fairly confident 
answer to our first question (Ql). In a series of passages in the middle 
Dialogues Plato contrasts Forms with the sensibles that participate in them; in 
these contrasts, systematically studied by Vlastos, Plato brings into relief a 
number of attributes which Forms have but which the sensibles that participate 
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in them do not have. These attributes -- which we may provisinally call ideal 
attributes of the Forms -- constitute the being and essence of the Forms. More­
over -- to skip for a moment to our second question (Q2) -- it is precisely 
these attributes that make possible the knowability of the Forms or the Forms' 
being "cognitively reliable", in Vlastos' phrase; so that if we can understand 
how the Form of the Good is "the causeir of the ideal attributes, we will also be 
able to understand how it is "the cause" of the Forms' knowability. Let us 
take a brief look at these contrasts. 
In the �· 211AB Plato says that unlike the many beautiful (sensible) 
things that participate in it, Beauty itself always exists, it is neither generated 
nor destroyed, it does not increase or decrease, and exists by itself. More-
over, in contrast to sensible beautiful things, Beau.ty itself is not beautiful 
in one respect (or part) and ugly in another, nor beautiful at one time and not 
another, nor beautiful by comparison to one thing and ugly by comparison to 
another, nor beautiful here and ugly there being beautiful for some and ugly for 
others. Let us refer to the two sets of attributes of the Form Beauty listed (or 
implied) in the above two sentences as "Il" and "I2" ("I" for "Ideal attributes") 
respectively. Now in the Rep. Bk. V Plato tells us several times (477A, 478D, 
478E, 479A-C) that the objects of knowledge, the Forms, "are" whereas the objects 
of belief, the sensibles that participate in Forms, "both are and are not." 
Professor Vlastos has argued convincingly, I think, that it is not existence 
that is being asserted here of the Forms (and asserted and denied of sensibles), 
but rather perfection or complete reality; and this in turn is to be interpreted 
in terms of our second set of the ideal attributes (I2) listed in the Symposium. 
To say of the Form Circle (or Justice) that it "is" whereas a sensible circle 
"is and is not" is to say that the Form Circle is always circular (just), is 
circular (just) in all respects or parts, is circular (just) no matter what it 
is compared to, and is circular (just) to all who apprehend it no matter from 
hwere; whereas a sensible circle (a just man) is sometimes circular (just) and 
sometimes not, and so on. As Vlastos points out, Plato himself expands the "is 
and is not" formula in some of these ways at 479A-C for the cases of beautiful 
things, just things, pious things, doubles, halves, great and small things, 
light and heavytO In all these contrasts Plato surely intends to bring into 
relief "the being and essence (reality)" of the Forms, and he does it in terms of 
our ideal attributes Il and I2. Moreover, in the Rep. Bk. V, sensibles.are unknow­
able and can be only objects of belief precisely because they lack the ideal attri­
butes of the Forms;ll and this supports our answer to our second question, Q2,
that it is the ideal attributes of the Forms that make possible the knowability 
of the Forms. In sum, and in answers to Ql and Q2, the being and essence 
(reality) of the Forms consists of their ideal attributes (Il and 12), and an 
object must have these to be knowable. 
Let us now go to our third and more difficult question (Q3), assuming 
the answers that we just gave to Ql and Q2. Let us first tackle part of Q3:
in what sense of "cause" can we plausibly suppose that the Form of the Good is the 
cause of the ideal attributes (being and essence) of the Forms? In the case of 
the Sun and sensible things, the Sun is presumably the (an) efficient cause of 
their generation and growth and nurture (as well as their visibility). But there 
is no generation and growth and nurture in the case of the Forms, nor are the 
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Forms probably ever conceived by Plato as efficient causes.12 In all probabi­
lity formal causation is meant via the relation of participation. If so, then 
the Form of the Good is the cause of the ideal attributes of the other Forms 
in the sense that 
Gll.l It is by virtue of participating in the Form of the Good 
that all the other Forms have their ideal attributes. 
This is our interpretation of the relevant part of Gll. 
We are now within sight of an answer to the more difficult part of 
Q3, the part concerning the nature of the Form of the Good. For it seems to 
follow from Gll.l and the distinction between proper and ideal attributes that 
Gl2 The ideal attributes of all the Forms other than the Form 
of the Good are proper attributes of the Form of the Good. 
A host of questions now face us. I will list and discuss them in 
an order that may help us answer them. Q4 Why should Plato think that the 
Form of the Good, rather than some other Form or no Form at all, is the formal 
cause of the ideal attributes of all the other Forms? QS Did Plato conflate 
reality and goodness, as the joining of the present interpretation with Vlastos' 
interpretation of the doctrine of degrees of reality would seem to imply? 
Q6 What is the distinction between ideal and proper attributes, and did Plato 
make or at least observe it so that we are justified in attributing Gl2 to him 
partly on the basis of it? Q7 How is the goodness of sensible objects to be 
accounted for on the present interpretation? These are large and difficult 
question and I can only hope to indicate in outline what I think are the right 
answers. 
We can begin to see a connection between goodness and the ideal attri­
butes of the Forms if we assume one of Plato's standard ways of conceiving the 
Forms in the middle dialogues, that is, if we think of the Forms not as proper­
ties but as ideal examplars complete with non-Pauline self-predication.13 On 
this assumption, each Form is the best object of its kind there is or can be. 
The Form Circle, for example, is the best circle there is or can be, the Form 
Justice the best (most) just thing there is or can be. Now Plato thinks, I 
believe, that it is by virtue of its ideal attributes that each Form (other 
than the Form of the Good) is the best object of its kind. Let us take the 
examples of Circle and Justice, a mathematical and an ethical Form, and try to 
see this connection with each of the four ideal attributes 12. It is the ideal 
attribute of being circular in every respect or part of itself that makes the 
Form circle a perfect circle or the best circle there is or can be; it is pre­
cisely the lack of this attribute that makes sensible circles imperfect circles, 
"in contact with the straight everywhere11.14 Again, the ideal attribute of 
being circular no matter compared to what assures us that there is no circle 
relative to which the Form circle is not or is less circular. On the other hand, 
it is more difficult, as Keyt has noted,15 to see a connection between being 
always circular and the superlative goodness of kind of the Form Circle. Actu­
ally, there are connections here and there from which Plato may have over­
generalized: for example, we count durability or high degree of resistance to 
Ja good making characteristic in the case of such artifacts as knives� 
.nd cars. Plato himself makes a similar connection in Rep. 380D-
e he argues that the better a state or condition a thing is in the 
'ble it is to change. And in the case of some ethical concepts such as "the connection seems very plausible: a man who is-always just is more 
·"·st man than one who is just in some tempercll strt>tches nnd not otlwrs. · 
• things being equal. But probably, given Plato's assumptlon that onlv
'Is invariable can be known, the best connection we can make between the 
i;]_ �ttribute of, say, being always circular and the superlative goodness 
.:'ik:ind of the Form Circle is between the attribute and the epistemic value 
·£(.'the Form: this attribute contributes to the Form Circle's being the epistemic 
.iradigm of its kind, the best object of its kind to know. And the same seems 
· 
true of the fourth ideal attribute, being circular to all who apprehend it no 
from where. It.seems then that the first two ideal attributes of the 
Form Circle contribute to its being the best circle there is or can be, and the 
· 
remaining two attributes contribute to. its being the best circle to know. And 
presumabely similarly for the other Forms other than the Form of the Good. If 
so, we can add another proposition to Plato's theory of the Form of the Good: 
Gl3 It is by virtue of their ideal attributes that the Forms 
(other than the Form of the Good) are the best objects of 
their kind (or, have supc;�lative goodness of kind). 
And from Gll.l and Gl3, it seems that we can derive the proposition: 
Gl4 It is by virtue of participating in the Form of the Good 
that all the other Forms are the best objects of their 
kind and the best objects of their kind to know. 
Thus the Form of the Good is, as it should be, the formal cause of the superla­
tive goodness of kind of all the other Forms. We can see, perhaps in a short­
circuit way, that this proposition is on the right track, from a Platonic point 
of view, on the assumption that the Forms (other than the Good) are ideal exem­
plars: for on this assumption the forms have something in common, namely, their 
being the best objects of their kind; so it is natural that there should be a 
Form in virtue of which they have this in common, and in view of what this 
common feature is, it is natural that the Form would be the Good. 
But now, having seen how it is appropriate for the Good to be the 
formal cause of the superlative goodness of kind of the Forms, we are faced with 
the question (raised by QS) 0£. how it is that it is also appropriate for the 
Good to be the formal cause of the superlative reality of kind of the Forms. For 
on Vlastos' interpretation of the doctrine of degrees of reality, which I believe 
is generally accurate, it is by virtue of (what we have called) .their ideal at­
tributes that the Forms are the most real objects of therr kind. And from this 
and Gll.l it seems that we can derive the proposition 
Gl5 It is by virtue of participation in the Form of the Good 
that all the other Forms are the most real objects of their 
kind (or, have superlative reality of kind). 
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The answer to our question is, I believe, that here we do have a "conflation" 
of superlative reality of kind and superlative goodness of kind. For it is 
by virtue of the very same ideal attributes, it seems, that a Form is both the 
best object of its kind and the most real object of its kind. Thus the super­
lative goodness of a given kind and the superlative reality of the same kind 
coincide, not only in the sense that the best and most real objects of a given 
kind are one and the same, .. i.e., the Form of that kind, but also in the stronger 
sense that it is the very same ideal attributes of a Form that constitute both 
its superlative reality and its superlative goodness of kind. But heie we must 
be careful when we speak of "conflation": Vlastos has argued successfully, I 
believe, that Plato distinguishes between reality and existence; the above 
conflation does not by itself imply a confusion of existence and goodness. The 
theory, so far at least, does not sanction an inference from the fact that some­
thing exists to an attribution of goodness to it; it is not, not yet at least, in 
viblation of the Humean dictum that one cannot derive "ought" (value) from 
"is" (fact) alone. In any case I doubt that Plato was ever tempted to draw the 
inference in this direction; he did not have high regard for the world, physi­
cal or social, that the sense revealed and he would be perhaps the last philo­
sopher to draw an inference from what this world was like to what it ought to 
be. His temptation and his danger, as the Phaedo and the Timaeus show,16 was 
drawing the inference in the reverse direction: from the supposition that it 
should be good that a certain state of affairs obtain (e.g. that the moon and 
the planets should move in certain ways) to the conclusion that it does actually 
obtain. But, in any case, the logical source of such an inference would not be 
only the present conflation of superlative reality and superlative goodness, 
but also Plato's hypothesis that the physical world was fashioned by a divine 
craftsman, who was completely good and unenvious, using the perfect Forms as 
his models. Thus, from the point of view of the autonomy of ethics -- the 
logical independence of goodness and rightness from brute facts -- the present 
conflation of goodness and reality is harmless. But the conflation of course 
does imply that, if there are degrees of goodness as there must be and degrees 
of reality as indeed there are in Plato's theory, the better a thing of a given 
kind is the more real a thing of that kind it is and conversely. 
Ideal and Proper Attributes 
To make further progress we need now to go to Q6, the question con­
cerning the distinction between proper and ideal attributes. This distinction 
is crucial to our interpretation for a number of reasons, two of which are as 
follows: first, we answered the question concerning "the being and essence" of 
the Forms in terms of the ideal attributes of the Forms, which of course pre­
supposes the distinction; second, we attributed to Plato Gl2 partly on the 
basis of this distinction, and Gl2 itself is stated in terms of the distinction, 
so that we can hardly understand what Gl2 tells us about the nature of the Form 
of the Good unless we understand the distinction. Moreover, one would think 
that, as Keyt has pointed out,17 the distinction seems a necessary one for 
Plato to draw or at least observe; or, at any rate, it would be a useful one 
for Plato to draw or observe, if he could,18 since, e.g., it would enable him 
to disarm the two-level paradoxes often hurled by Aristotle against the theory 
of Forms.19 
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The distinction between ideal and proper attributes has been recently 
discussed by Owen, Vlastos, and Keyt, though the terminology is onl�0
used by 
Keyt, a terminology that I find appropriate in the present context. All 
three writers find the source of. the distinction in Aristotle, especially 
Topics 137b3-13, but it is not clear that they conceive the distinction in the 
same way, and they disagree as to whether Plato or the Academy ever drew or 
observed or could have drawn the distinction (as well as to whether Aristotle 
ever concedes the distinction to the Platonists). Let us first take a brief 
look at the ways they draw the distinction. Owen writes: 
Given any Platonic Idea, at least two and possibly three very 
different sorts of thing can be said about it. (A) Certain 
things will be true of it in virtue of its status as an Idea, 
e.g., that it is immutable. These predicates (call them 'A­
predicates') will be true of any idea whatever. (B) Certain 
things will be true of it in virtue of the particular concept it 
represents: these (call them 'B-predicates') are sometimes held 
to fall into two radically different groups. (Bl) ... (B2) Other 
predicates belong to the idea because ... they are simply accepted 
as serving to define the particular concept in question. Man, 
for instance, is two-footed and an animal. (2£. Cit., p. 108;
cf. also pp. 119-120.)
We are not interested here in Bl-predicates, but only in the distinction between 
A-predicates (corresponding to Keyt's ideal predicates) and B2-predicates 
(corresponding to Keyt's proper predicates). Vlastos introduces the distinction 
in Aristotle's terms: 
... sentences of the form "the Idea of F is P" ... are analyzed 
by Aristotle as true if P is predicated of "the Idea qua Idea11 
and false if predicated of it "qua F,11 as, e.g., "The Idea of 
Man is resting," whose ambiguity is resolved by the observa­
tion that "resting belongs to Man-himself not qua man, but qua 
Idea [Here Vlastos quotes Topics 137B6-7]. (Op.Cit., p. 323.) 
Presumably, the predicates that belong to the Idea (Form) Man qua Idea corres­
pond to Keyt's ideal attributes and Owen's A-predicates and those that belong 
to the Idea Man qua Man correspond to Keyt's proper attributes and Owen's 
B2-predicates. Finally, Keyt discusses the Topics passage, introduces the 
terms "ideal" and "proper" and defines the two notions: 
Aristotle here distinguishes two respects in which a Form may 
possess an attribute. The attribute of rest belongs to the Idea 
of man as Idea; on the other hand, the attribute of being composed 
of soul and body belongs to the Idea of living creature as living 
creature . An attribute that belongs to an Idea as Idea I shall 
call an "ideal" attribute. An ideal attribute is one whose absence 
from a thing entails that the thing is not a Platonic Idea. This 
is my definition, not Aristotle's; but I hope i� marks out the 
class of attributes he has in mind. Notice that by my definition 
an ideal attribute is not simply one that belongs to every 
Form. 
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The second respect in which a Form may possess an attribute 
enters into Aristotle's characterization of a proprium: what 
is allegedly a proprium of such and such is really a proprium 
if and only if (1) it is an attribute of the Form of such and 
such, and (2) it belongs to the Form because the Form is such and 
such. Thus being composed of soul and body is a proprium of living 
creature since it is an attribute of the Form of living creature 
and an attribute because the Form is a living creature (bll-13); 
but rest is not a proprium of man since, although an attribute 
of the Form of man, it is not an attribute because the Form is 
a man. 
Keyt next notes that what Aristotle has characterized here is not a proprium, 
strictly, i.e. "a non-defining attribute that belongs to this thing alone" 
(Topics, 102al8-19) but something broader, and introduces his definition of 
proper attribute: 
Taking my lead from Aristotle's temporary, broad characterization 
of a proprium, I shall call an attribute that belongs to a Form 
in this second respect a "proper" attribute. I use 'proper' here 
in the sense in which it means 'peculiar' and is opposed to 'common'. 
Again, I suggest a definition what I hope captures the class of 
attributes Aristotle has in mind: a proper attribute of a given 
Form is one whose absence from a thing entails that the thing 
is not an instance of the given Form. Thus animal is a proper 
attribute of the Form of man; for if a thing is nto an animal, 
it cannot be a man. (Qp_.Cit., pp. 12, 13.) 
The first question that arises is whether the distinction between 
ideal and proper attributes of Forms is compatible with the ontology of Plato's 
theory of Forms. Vlastos seems to argue that it is not. If he is right, it 
can hardly be a good idea to expound Plato's theory of goodness using the dis­
tinction, as I have done. We can use a distinction an author did not make, to 
expound and illuminate his theory provided the distinction is compatible with 
his theory; Vlastos did so himself in his illuminating paper "An Ambiguity in 
the Sophist." But if the distinction is.not compatible, we will probably end 
up distoring the theory. Is Vlastos then right? Well, I think he is and he 
isn't. The issue turns on two points: (1) whether we conceive of the Forms 
as ideal exemplars complete w::Lth non-Pauline self-predication, or as properties 
that are not self-predicational; and, perhaps, (2) on how we construe sentences 
of the form "P belongs to the Form F qua F ". Vlastos is right, I think, if we 
conceive of the Forms as (transcendent) properties which are not non-Pauline 
self-predicational; and he is right in the sense that, under this supposition, 
the distinction would not apply to the Forms. For, so far as I can see, if 
the Forms are not (non-Pauline) self-predicational, they would have no proper 
attributes at all, and the distinction would be at least idle as applied to 
the Forms; and Vlastos would be right in arguing, as he does;, (QE.Cit., P· 332) 
that while the expression 'the Idea of Animal "qua Idea"' would have a referent, 
namely the Form Animal, the expression "the Idea of Animal qua_ Animal 11 could 
or would have none (for indeed the latter expression implies that the Idea of 
Animal is an animal). On the other hand, if the Forms are conceived as ideal 
t. 
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exemplars with non-Pauline self-predication, the distinction is perfectly com­
patible with the theory of Forms and indeed applies to it; on this conception 
the referent of the above two expressions would be one and the same, namely 
the Form Animal. To go to point (2), the function of the word translated "qua" 
in the present context is, I think, simply to indicate the inferential basis 
on which the attribute is asserted of the subject. Though we need a systematic 
study of Aristotle's uses of this important word (he puts it to many important 
uses, and the notion is crucial to some later philosophers such as Spinoza), I 
believe that in its present use it is the descendant, so to speak, of Plato's 
"in virtue of" and can plausibly be rendered by "because", as Owen and Keyt 
often take it. Thus, to say, for example, that rest belongs to Living Creature 
itself qua Form is to indicate the inferential basis on which the attribute of 
being at rest is asserted of Living Creature itself. The complete inference 
is: Living Creature itself is a Form; all Forms are at rest; therefore, Living 
Creature itself is at rest. Similarly, to say that being composed of body and 
soul belongs to Living Creature itself qua living creature is to indicate the 
inferential basis on which the attribute is asserted of the subject. The 
complete inference is: Living Creature itself is a living creature; all living 
creatures are composed of body and soul; therefore, Living Creature itself is 
composed of body and soul. Here, non-Pauline self-predication is explicitly 
stated in the complete inference, and is implicit in the expression "qua living 
creature". This construction of "qua", essentially as "because", begins to 
disarm, I think, the other objection that Vlastos has to applying the distinc­
tion to Forms. He cites Symp. 211A, where Plato denies that the Form Beauty 
"is beautiful in on e way (or, in one respect), ugly in another", and says that 
"the Aristotelian formula establishes the P-distinction at the price of losing 
this very feature of the Idea, allowing it to be P and not-P but in different 
respects, P F, not-P F". (QE_. Cit. , p. 331.) Now this is a case 
where, on Vlastos' own interpretation,21 the Form Beauty is conceived by Plato 
as being non-Pauline self-predicational, i.e. the Form Beauty is beautiful, 
so this objection if correct ·cuts across our argument concerning (1). But on 
the present construction of "qua" as "because" I do not think that the objection 
is sound: to allow that the attribute P belong to the Form F qua F and does 
not belong to the Form F qua Form is not necessarily to allow that the Form F 
is P in one respect and not-P in another respect; for on the present interpre­
tation of "qua" as "because" the negation sign goes in front of the whole 
"because" clause, not in front of the .attribute sign "P". What is denied is 
not that P belongs to the Form of F, but only that P belongsto the Form F because 
it is a Form; and the latter denial is perfectly compatible with P belonging to 
the Form F. Thus Plato can deny the attribute of being composed of body and 
soul belongs to the Form Living creature because it is a Form, without denying 
that this attribute belongs to this Form. And the Euthyphro shows that Plato 
is capable of making such a point, since there he denies that anything, inclu­
ding Holiness, is holy because it is loved by all the gods while allowing that 
Holiness is loved by all gods. In any case, in the Syrop. passage what Plato is 
denying is that the Form Beauty can be qualified in any way relative to its 
proper, self-predicational attributes; i.e. he wants to say that the Form Beauty 
is beautiful in all respects, always, etc. This point would not be compromised 
by his allowing that the Form Beauty is beautiful because of ·the particular 
Form it is and also that it is at rest (invariant) because it is a Form. 
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I conclude, then, that the distinction between ideal and proper 
attributes is perfectly compatible with the ontology of Plato's theory of Forms, 
provided that we conceive of the Forms as ideal exemplars with self-predication, 
and provided that we interpret "qua" as "because". Here I must make it expli­
cit that I am not maintaining that Plato always and consistently conceived of 
the Forms as ideal exemplars with self-predication. I am only maintaining that 
sometimes he so conceived them, and in particular that he so conceived them in 
the middle dialogues and in conjunction with his theory of goodness in the 
Republic. .We shall presently see that this conception seems indeed essential 
to this theory of the Form of the Good. 
We are now free to take up the question whether Plato ever made ex­
plicitly the distinction between proper and ideal attributes -- which he never 
did, or (the more interesting question) whether he observed the distinction in 
practice in the sense that his expressed views and arguments are consistent with 
it. This question is related to our question Q7, how the goodness of sensible 
things is to be accounted for on the theory of the Form of the Good as we inter­
preted it. Now Keyt has produced striking evidence that Plato confused ideal 
and proper attributes of Forms. He says: 
Although Aristotle, in commenting on the theory of Forms, draws 
this very distinction, there is striking evidence that Plato 
himself overlooked it. The evidence, apart from his silence on 
the matter, consists in some bad mistakes that he would have 
been unlikely to make if he had seen it. (Keyt, (1), p. 23U) 
The "bad mistakes" consist in certain inferences that Plato makes in the Timaeus 
from certain Forms, used as models, having certain features to their sensible 
copies having these features. The general context is familiar. The divine 
craftsman (the Dimiurge), being good and unenvious, wishes to make the sensible 
world as good as possible; to do this he takes the Forms as his models and tries 
to fashion the sensible world after the Forms as much as possible (that is, I 
suppose, as much as is possible given the defective nature of matter). In 
particular the dimiurge copies the Form of living creature. This Form, Keyt 
says, "has only one feature that a sane craftsman would copy, having a soul 
and a body" (a proper attribute of the Form); but "the Dimiurge is not content 
to stop here. He notices that his model is unique, timeless, and generic, and 
proceeds to copy these attributes" (presumably ideal attributes). (p. 232.) 
In the case of the first of these latter attributes, Keyt quotes Timaeus 3la2-5 
Plato's argument is this: the cosmos was made according to 
its model; its model is unique; therefore, the ccismos is unique. 
If Plato accepts this argument, he should also accept the fol­
lowing one, which within his system has true premises and a 
false conslusion: the planet Mercury was made according to its 
model (the Form of heavenly god); its model is unique; therefore, 
Mercury is the only heavenly god (that is, the only celestial 
body)." (pp.232-233.) 
Concerning an inference from the second ideal attribute, Keyt cites 37c6-38c3 
and interprets: 
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Plato's argument is this: the cosmos resembles its model as 
closely as it cap; its model is timeless, which it cannot be; 
so the cosmos bas a feature that resembles, although it falls 
short of the timelessness of its model (namely, eternal temporal 
duration). By the same reasoning a circle that is drawn on
paper and preserved for a year would resemble the Form of ·circle 
more closely than one that is drawn with the same accuracy by 
immediately erased." (p. 233.) 
Keyt makes a similar point regarding a similar inference from the attribute of 
being "generic". He also cites Parmenides 132c9-ll as containing a similar 
argument, the argument "that since Forms are thoughts [on a given hypothesis 
temporarily proposed by Socrates] and things share in the Forms, each of these 
things is itself composed of thoughts", and says that this argument is "a para­
digm of the fallacy of division." (pp. 234-35). It is because he copies these 
ideal attributes that the divine craftsman is "mad". And Vlastos, in his 
Plato's Universe understandably refers to one of these inferences of Plato's 
as "a curious error." (p. 29.) 
�e are now in the happy or unhappy position to show that, given our 
interpretation of the Form of the Good in the Republic, Plato "had" to make 
these "curious mistakes" and his divine craftman "had" to be "mad". For we 
can show that copying the ideal attributes of the Forms, if one wishes to make 
sensible things as good as possible, is a direct consequence of the views that 
the Form of the Good is the formal cause of the being and the �ssence of the 
other Forms and that the being and the essence of the Forms consists in their 
ideal attributes. We are assuming that in the Timaeus, when Plato was making 
these "curious mistakes", the Forms are still conceived as ideal exemplars 
with self-predication -- the best objects of their kind -- for why else would 
the Dimiurge copy them if he wished to make sensible things as good as possible? 
And the position is happy for our interpretation since it provides evidence for 
it, but unhappy for Plato if the inferences are the "bad mistakes" Keyt seems to 
show them to be. 
To see why it is that Plato had to make the "curious mistakes" and 
why his Dimiurge had to be "mad", on the interpretation we have given of the 
Form of the Good, let us go to our question Q7: on this interpretation how 
is the goodness of sensible things to be accounted for? Let us work with three 
kinds of examples, a mathematical Form, Circle, a "natural kind" Form, Living 
Creature, and an ethical Form, Justice. To be a circle or circular a sensible 
must participate in the Form Circle, and this is participation in the proper 
attributes of the Form, namely being circular (and perhaps to all those attri­
butes being entailed by this proper attribute, e.g. being a figure). But to be 
a good circle (to some degree) a sensible, on the interpretation we have given, 
must participate (to some degree) in the ideal attributes of the Form Circle: 
for. on that interpretation, it is the ideal attributes of the Form Circle that 
constitute its superlative goodness and it is by virtue of having these ideal 
attributes that the Form Circle participates in the Form of the Good. Parti­
cipation merely in the proper attributes of the Form circle (to some degree, if 
degrees of participation in proper attributes is allowed) would have no tendency 
to show that the sensible is a good circle (to some degree), for there is not 
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necessarily any connection between the proper attributes of this Form (or the 
Form Triangle, or Square, or Chiliagon, or Four or Five) and the Form of the 
Good. But participation (to some degree, and here degrees are appropriate) in 
the ideal attributes of being circular in every respect, always, no matter 
compared to what, and to all who apprehend it no matter from where, would show 
that the participant is a good circle (to some degree, or comparatively), for 
it is these attributes that make the Form Circle the best circle there is or can 
be and it is by virtue of having these that it participates in the Form of the 
Good. And similarly with the goodness of sensible living creatures. Thus, if
the Dimiurge wished merely to create or fashion a sensible living creature it 
would be sufficient for him to copy the proper attributes of the Form of living 
creature, such as being composed of body and soul. But if he wishes to create 
a sensible living creature that is as good as possible he can only do so, given 
the present interpretation of the Form of the Good of the Republic, by copying 
as much as possible the ideal attributes of the Form. Thus, far from being 
"mad" for doing so, he would be "mad" -- or rather futile -- if hd didn't! 
Correspondingly, "the curious mistakes" and the "bad arguments" of Plato should 
begin to appear less curious and not as bad: for we are now to understand the 
theory of the Form of the Good in the Republic as an implicit premise(s) in these 
arguments. For example, the argument "from eternity" would be more complicated 
roughly perhaps as follows: the Form of Living Creature is the Best living 
creature there is or can be; it is by virtue of being eternal (among other things, 
or "eternal" standing for a summary of its ideal attributes) that it is the best 
object of its kind and it is by virtue of this that it participates in the Form 
of the Good; therefore, if one wishes to fashion a sensible living creature as 
good as possible one must copy the "eternity" of the Form as much as possible.22 
Of course I am speaking here to the validity of Plato's argument, not its sound­
ness -- but this is the point to which Keyt is speaking and certainly part of 
Vlastos' "curious". The soundness of the argument is quite another matter, for 
this depends on the truth of the theory that according to me is the theoretical 
backbone of the argument. For the present we may note, in addition that Plato 
or his craftsman would never make the mad mistakes of some of Keyt's illustra­
tions, for example, the mistake of making a paper shield and justifying himself 
on the ground that his pattern (model) was of paper (p. 231 ). Far from sanc­
tioning such mistakes the theory excludes them wholsesale: for no sensible ob­
ject is a reliable model, certainly never the best model, for making a good object 
of a kind; only the best objects of a kind are, the ideal exemplars, the Forms; 
sensible objects are copies or copies of copies. The "paperness" of the "model" 
paper shield, far from making the best shield there is or can be, makes it one 
of the worst -- a point we can accept. Of course Keyt was only illustrating in 
this passage the type of mistake he is attributing to Plato --- he was not saying 
that Plato or his Di.mi.urge would make this mistake. But now we can see why 
they wouldn't. If we construct a parallel argument, to the one we have recon­
structed above about "eternity", but with ahy sensible object as the model, the 
theoretical premises of this argumentwould be false for Plato: for him no sen­
sible object is the best object of its kind; and far from the ideal attributes 
of material objects -- their materiality, their variable nature -- being what 
makes them the best objects of their kind, they are precisely what makes them 
irremediably defective. 
-16-
Here we can begin to see where the fault really lies -- in Plato's 
theory. It lies in the combination of the conception of Forms as self-predi­
cational with the theory of goodness, the theory that the Form of the Good is
the formal cause of the ideal attributes of the Forms and that it is by virtue 
of these that the Forms are the best objects of their kind. Without self-pre­
dication this theory of goodness would collapse; for without it the Forms would 
not be ideal exemplars -- the best objects of their kind -- and so there would 
be no motivation at all for supposing that the Form of the Good is the formal 
cause of the being and the essence of the Forms.23 But why is this combination 
faulty? For one thing, it seems to imply all the absurdities of non-Pauline 
self-predication. To be the best possible shield -- the best object of its 
kind 
�-
a thing would have to be both a Form and a shield, an immaterial shield! 
Can there be such a thing? And would it be the best possible shiled? For 
another, the theory seems inadequate as a theory of goodness, for it seems to 
imply that proper attributes are irrelevant to the goodness of a thing. Can 
this be correct? Even according to Plato's other theory of goodness in the 
Republic, the theory of virtue and function of the first book, a shield is a 
good shield insofar as it performs its function well; and surely this has to do 
with its size and shape, its balance, its weight and degree of impenetrability24 
-- all apparently proper attributes; whereas, according to the theory of the 
Form of the Good, the goodness of the sensible shield depends only on the degree 
to which it resembles the ideal attributes of the Form Shield -- its invariance 
indestructibility, its always being a shiled, its being a shield in every respect, 
and so on. Moreover, in the case of certain ethical Forms, Plato seems to hold 
a strong connection between their proper attributes and the Form of the Good. 
For him, being a just man (or, a just city) entails being a good man (o� a good 
city). But being just is certainly a proper attribute of the Form Justice. 
So in addition to the connection between the ideality of the Form Justice and 
the Form of the Good (a connection which is the same as that between the idealiy 
of any Form and the Form of the Good), there is also a strong entailment con­
nection between the proper attribute of the Form, being just, an the Form of 
the Good. This, it appears, is as it should be (I mean, there ought to be such 
a connection). But if so, it seems to contradict the theory of the Form of the 
Good we have expounding; or at any rate, if this is so, the Form of the Good 
cannot conssit just in the ideality common to all the Forms. And in the latter 
case why should we suppose that the goodness entailed by being just is the same 
as the goodness by virtue of which all the Forms are the best objects of their 
kind, or that there is even any connection between the two? The goodness en­
tailed by being just is probably the functional goodness mentioned earlier; for 
it is on the basis of the theory of function and virtue that the definitions 
of just city and just man are framed. But how this theory of functional good­
ness is connected with the theory of the Form of the Good is not clear. 
Have we succeeded in showing that the distinction between ideal and 
proper attributes, though not explicitly drawn by Plato, is consistent with his 
his expressed views and arguments? Perhaps not entirely� though it is illumi­
nating to expound his theory of the Form of the Good in terms of it. Let us 
look again at our data and indulge in some hopefully educated specualtion. In 
the passages in the�· and the Rep., where Plato contrasts the Forms with the 
sensibles that participate in them, we found the following situation: unlike 
the sensibles that participate in it, the Form Beauty (Justice, Circle, Living 
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Creature, etc.) (Il) always exists, is neither generated or destroyed, does not 
increase or decrease, exists by itself; further, it (I2) is beautiful (just, etc.) 
in all respects, is always beautiful, is beautiful no matter compared to what, 
and is beautiful to all who apprehend it no matter from where. Now Plato in
these passages was clear, I think, that the Form Beauty "has" these two sets of. 
attributes whereas its sensible participants do not; and presumably similarly 
with the other Forms listed in these passages. Further, it is clear that the 
Form Beauty could have the first set of attributes (Il) whether it were conceived 
as a property without non-Pauline self-predication or as an ideal exemplar with 
such self-predication. But the Form Beauty could not have the second set of 
attributes (I2) unless it were non-Pauline self-predicational; for it obviously 
could not be always beautiful or beautiful in all respects unless it were beau-
tiful to begin with. And similarly with the other Forms. This much is not 
speculation. But now when we bring in the distinction between ideal and proper 
attributes a curious situation develops. The attributes Il are ideal attributes 
of the Forms no matter whether we draw the distinction according to Aristotle, 
Owen, Keyt, or Vlastos. And being beautiful, being circular, being just, (and 
all the attributes entailed by them) are proper attributes of the corresponding 
Forms, at least according to Keyt's definition (and, I think, Owen's and Aristotle's). 
But the attributes of set I2 -- e.g. being always beautiful, being beautiful in 
all respects, etc., "straddle the fence": these attributes, which I "provisionally" 
called ideal attributes above, are neither ideal attributes nor proper attributes 
according to Keyt's definitions, yet they have connections with both. Unlike 
the attribute of being circular, being always circular is not a proper attribute 
of the Form circle according to Keyt's definition since its absence from a thing 
would not entail that the thing is not an instance of the Form Circle; according 
to Plato sensible circles are instances of the Form Circle and yet none of them 
is always circular. Again, the attribute of always being circular is not an 
ideal attribute of the Form Circle according to Keyt's definition since the 
absence of it from a thing would not entail that the thing is not a Platonic Idea; 
for Plato there are lots of Forms, e.g. the Form Square, that are not circular 
at all and hence not always circular. At the same time, attributes I2 have con­
nections to both proper attributes and ideal attributes Il. The connectidn with 
proper attributes is that attributes I2 entail the corresponding proper attri­
butes; being always beautiful entails being beautiful, being beautiful in all 
respects entails being beautiful. In this respect attributes I2 are unlike attri­
butes Il. But there is an important respect in which Il and 12 are alike: just 
as without being a Form a thing could not have attributes 11, so without being 
a Form a thing could not have attributes 12. Nothing could be always such and 
such or such and such in all respects, etc. without being a Form. Ant this is 
my justification for calling these "provisionally" ideal attributes. We can 
put the "straddling of the fence" feature of 12 attributes in a nutshell as 
follows: The Form Circle is circular (proper attribute) not because it is a 
Form but because of the particular Form it is; it is indestructible (Il) not be­
cause of the particular Form it is but because it is a Form; but it is always 
circular (12) both because it iis a Form and because ofthe particular Form it is. 
Now we can speculate that it is pretty unlikely that somebody would see this 
point unless he drew the distinction between proper and ideal attributes expli­
citly and asked himself to which genus the three types of attributes (11, 12, 
and proper) belong. And since Plato never explicitly drew the distinction 
it is pretty unlikely that he did this. But Plato does work with the three 
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types of attributes in the various contexts. And the theory of the Form of the 
Good in the Republic, in which the Form of the Good is the formal cause of the 
being and essence of the Forms, requires him to include attributes of type 12, 
as well as type Il, in the being and essence of the Forms. For, as we have 
argued, without 12 theForms would not be ideal exemplars, the best objects of 
their kind. Nor would they be the best objects of their kind to know, since in 
epistemology the' best objects to know must be undeceptive, and this is assured by 
12 �ttribute of the Forms not appearing such and such from one point of view and 
not �uch and such from another. So· in the context of the theory of the Form of 
the Good and the epistemology of the Republic Plato was probably lumping together 
11 and 12 as belonging to the same genus, the ideality of the Forms. And Plato 
uses general summary phrases that could cover both.23 At the same time, when
Plato is thinking in general of sensibles participating in the Forms he is 
thinking of participation in the proper attributes of the Forms. But when he is 
thinking of the (relative) goodness of sensible things, in the context of the 
theory of the Form of the Good of the Republic, he is required to think, as we 
argued, of participation in the 12 attributes of the Forms if such participation 
is going to be a ground for the sensible being good of a kind to some degree -­
and this is the context of the Timaeus arguments. Now since 12 attributes entail 
the corresponding proper attributes, such participation would entail participa­
tion also in the proper attributes. Here in a sense 12 and proper attributes 
are lumped together. But this lumping together is perhaps harmless so long 
as participation in 12 attributes admits of degre�s -- which assures degrees 
of goodness -- and so long as such participation always "falls short" of complete 
participation, which blocks the disastrous result that such participation would 
entail that the sensibles are Forms (a parallel result to the result of the 
argument in the Parmenides 132c9-ll mentioned by Keyt). 
It must also be noted that since the ideal attributes of the second 
kind (12) of a given Form entail the proper attributes of the Form (e.g. being 
always beautiful entails being beautiful), there is room here for another con­
fusion that would be vast indeed. If the Form of the Good is thought of a 
containing (or consisting in) the 12 attributes in a concrete rather than an 
abstract sense, then the Form ofthe Good would indeed entail the proper attri­
butes of all the other Forms. But I seriously doubt that Plato ever thought of 
the matter in this way. On such an interpretation, the Form of the Good would 
be a vast conjunction, a wild motley indeed, of all the 12 attributes of all 
the other Forms, concretely conceived; and the proper attributes of all the 
Forms would be equally deducible from the· Form of the Good. I think Plato thinks 
of the 12 attributes in an abstract way insofar as they are contained in the 
Form of the Good: it is in virtue of participating in the Form of the Good 
that the other Forms are "always the same", "the same in all respects", "the 
same no matter compared to what" and "the same to all who apprehend them no 
matter from where." These abstract phrases, the first of which he uses quite 
often, are supposed to catch the idea that, e.g. it is not in virtue of par­
ticipating in the Form of the Good that the Square itself contains four right angles, 
but it is in virtue of participating in the Form of the Good that Square itself 
always contains four right angles, contains four right angles.!£ all who appre-
hend it no matter from where, and so on. We have to think here of ideal attri­
butesI2in abstraction from the proper attributes contained in them. Plato, 
lacking the device of variables, tried to catch this abstraction, I believe, 
with the above phrases. It is important to see that this is very Platonic 
indeed: for the above phrases attempt to catch exactly what is common in the 
attributes of set 12. 
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We can finally end this long discussion of the second round by some 
hopefully educated speculation on what the Form of the Good would be, given 
our interpretation of the theory. Gl2 tells us that the ideal attributes of all 
the other Forms are proper attributes of the Form of the Good, and Gll.l tells 
us that the Form of the Good is the formal cause of the other Forms having 
their ideal attributes. So it would seem that theForm of the Good consists in 
or is constituted by the very ideality common to the other Forms by virtue of 
which they are the best objects of their kind and the best objects of their kind 
to know. Such ideality, it would seem, would have to be conceived pretty ab­
stractly, super-generally as it were. For one thing, it is not ideality, super­
lative goodness and superlative reality, of kind, as is the case with the other 
Forms. The Form of the Good is not a superlatively "good something-or-other", 
as Cooper points out;26 it is, presumably, superlatively good, period. The 
goodness of the other Forms is indeed superlative, but also partial, the super­
lative goodness of kind. Moreover, the other Forms are in a sense not self­
sufficient: they are the best objects of their kind by virtue of participating 
in the Form of the Good, and they are the most real objects of their kind for 
the same reason. But the Good itself is what it is presumably by virtue of 
itself. Whether it is to be "conceived in explicitly mathematical terms", as 
Cooper also says, seems to me dubious. The theory requires, rather, that mathe­
matical Forms, at any rate insofar as they are thought of as the best objects 
of their kind and the best objects of their kind to know, are conceived in terms 
of it. 
III 
The Third Round or Wave of Paradox: The Divided Line 
The third wave or paradox is the simile of the divided line, especially 
the statements that Plato makes about the upper two portions of the line (Rep. 
509C-511E). Though the Form of the Good is not explicitly mentioned in this 
section (except perhaps implicitly at 509D as the thing that "rules over the 
intelligible kind and region"), there is universal agreement among the commen­
tators that the Form of the Good is at the top of the ontological division of 
the line and knowledge of the Good at the top of the epistemological division, 
and there is no reason to doubt that this is indeed meant, especially as this 
harmonizes with the previous simile of the sun and the following allegory of 
the cave. We are not concerned here with the whole of the divided line and a 
complete interpretation of it, but only with the relations, ontological and 
epistemological, between the upper two portions of the line, the mathematical 
and the dialectical. 
Plato begins by characterizing these two portions as follows: 
... there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to 
investigate by treating as image s the things imitated in the 
former division, and by means of hypotheses from which it pro­
ceeds not up to a first principle but down to a confusio11 while 
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there is another section in which it advances from hypotheses 
to an unhypothesized beginning without using the images of the 
other section but by means of Forms themselves and proceeding 
through these. (Shorey, Grube, trans.) (509B) 
Glaucon says he does not fully understand and Socrates proceeds to explain each 
section further: 
• • .  students of geometry and arithmetic ... bypothesize (postulate, 
assume) the odd and the even and figures and the three kinds of 
angles ... , regard them as known, and treating them as hypotheses 
they do not find it necessary to give any account of them to 
themselves or others as if clear to all; these are their starting 
points, and going through the remaining steps they reach a con­
clusion on what they started to investigate. (SlOCD) • . .  You know 
also that they use visible figures and talk about them, but they 
are not thinking about them but about the models of which these 
are likenesses; they are making their point 'about the square 
itself, the diameter itself, not about the diameter which they 
draw ... (SlODE) 
Understand hen that by the other section of the intelligible 
I mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. 
It does not consider the hypotheses beginnings but really hypotheses, 
stepping stones, spring-boards in order to reach that which is 
unhypothetical and the beginning of all. Having reached this 
and again taking hold of what follows from it, it does come down 
to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, 
but proceeding by means of Forms and through Forms and ending 
in Forms. (SllBC) 
Finally Glaucon gives a summary of how he understands the matter and receives 
Socrates' approval: 
I understand, he said, but not completely, for you seem to be 
speaking of a mighty task -- that you wish to distinguish the 
intelligible reality contemplated by the science of dialectic 
as clearer than that viewed by the so-called sciences, for which 
their hypotheses are first principles. The students of the so 
called sciences, it is true, are compelled to study them by 
thought aad not by sense-perception, yet because they do not 
go back to a first principle but proceeding from hypotheses, you 
do not think that they have any clear understanding of their 
subjects, though these can be understood if approached from a first 
principle. You seem to me to call the attitude of mind of geo­
meters and such reasoning but not understanding, reasoning being 
midway between opinion and understanding. (SllCD) 
An immence amount has been written on these passages. Here I wish 
only to dispute two widely accepted points of interpretation and suggest an 
alternative interpretation which is the natural outcome of the second round. 
Both points seem crucial in understanding the epistemology of the divided line 
and the epistemological priority of the Form of the Good. 
- 2 1 -
The first point I wish to dispute is that Plato's point in calling 
the beginning of mathematics "hypotheses" is that they are underived, or un­
proved, or undeduced or undemonstrated. Concerning what hypotheses Plato was 
referring to there is much disagreement; just about everything has been suggested, 
including the odd itself, figures themselves, angles themselves, propositions 
asserting their existence, axioms attributing properties to them, and definitions 
of them. In this dispute I do not wish to enter. I assume that Plato was refer­
ring to whatever the mathematicians of his day used as Euclid uses definitions, 
axioms, and postulates at the beginning of the Elements. My concern is with 
what his point was in calling them hypotheses. The majority of commentators 
(Adam, Cornford, Ross, to mention only a few)27 suppose that his point is that 
these things are underived, unproved, or undemonstrated. Now it is true enough 
that if these things were used as Euclid uses definitions, axioms, and postulates, 
-- and apparently they were -- they were indeed underived or unproved or undemon­
s trated, unlike the theorems. But I do not believe that this is Plato's point 
in calling them "hypotheses" in this context. For one thing, while Plato calls 
the beginning points of geometry and arithmetic. "hypotheses" or "hypothetical" 
(he uses the noun, the adjective, and the verb), he twice in these passages calls
the beginning point of dialectic, that is the Form of the Good, "unhypothetical". 
Now if "hypothetical" here meant underived or unproved or undemonstrated, then 
presumably "unhypothetical" would mean "proved" or "demonstrated". But there
is no evidence whatsoever that Plato thought in these passages that the Form
of the Good (or propositions about its nature) could be proved or derived or 
demonstrated. On the contrary, by placing it at the beginning of knowledge he 
is implying that it is not derived or proved from something else. Indeed from 
what could it be derived in the present context? Adam, making the assumption 
we are disputing, says, in desperation I think, that it (the Good) is "itself 
proved by an exhaustive scrutiny of all noeta" (intelligibles). Just what this 
means -- and how this would make the Good "unhypothetical" -- he dose not tell 
us. In the second place, and aside from evidence, if one of Plato's complaints 
about mathematics were that its beginning(s) is (are) underived or unproved --
a defect that dialectic is to remedy -- he would be holding an obviously unten­
able position: for dialectic too wuuld have to start somewhere, and no matter 
hwere it began that beginning would have the same defect. But if this is not 
Plato's point, what is? I think it is simply that the beginnings of the mathe­
maticians do not constitute knowledge, their beginning points are not known. 
They are beginnings of mathematics, but they are not beginnings(s) of knowledge; 
and for this reason, the propositions they validly derive from them, the theorems, 
are also not really known. As to whether the mathematicians realize this, 
Plato's text seems ambiguous; he says they regard them "as known", "give no 
account of them", supposing "they are obvious to everybody". (SlOC) But he 
seems clear that dialectic "does not consider the hypotheses beginnings but 
really hypotheses" (SllB); that is, they are not considered by the dialectician 
as beginnings of knowledge but really unknown. How knowledge of the Form of 
the Good -- which is the correct beginning of knowledge -- helps to convert 
these unknown hypotheses into knowledge, we will take up presently. 
The second major point of interpretation I wish to dispute, a point 
that goes naturally with the firdt point, is that Plato holds that once we 
(doing dialectic) have reached the Form of the Good and have knowledge of it, 
we can deduce or derive from this knowledge the hypotheses of the mathematicians. 
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This idea goes naturally with the first point we disputed, since such a deduc­
tion would r:emedy_ the alleged defect of the hypotheses of the mathematicians. 
The idea that Plato had such a deduction in view is also widely held, from 
Adam to Cornford to Ross and beyond.28 Indeed Cornford tried to suggest how 
such a deduction might be possible by introducing another Form at the top, 
alongside the Good, namely Unity, presumably a m'a.thematical Form. Ross cor­
rectly pointed out that there is no evidence whatsoever for this in our texts, 
but nevertheless continued to hold on to the idea of such a deduction. Now this 
idea seems to be the height of paradox indeed. To aim at deducing all of mathe-
matics from a few principles is a highly ambitious but not paradoxical ideal, 
one thatperhaps began to be approached in this century. To suppose that all 
of mathematics can be deduced from a single Platonic Form may begin to sound 
incredible. But to suppose further that this is the Form of the Good is para·­
doxical indeed: for there does not even seem a prima facie connection between 
goodness arid figures and numbers; the Form of the Good seems to be the wrong 
Form for this role. Do we really have good evidence to suppose that in our 
passages Plato had such a deduction in mind? The passages in which Plato describes 
the "descent" from the Form of the Good to other Forms are obscure and ambiguous 
and the meaning of his words and phrases much in dispute. Here we do not even 
have strong evidence, not to speak of compelling evidence, that he held such a 
view. Moreover, such a view would seem to involve a vast confusion of ideal 
and proper attributes. For the hypotheses of the mathematicians are about the 
proper attributes of the Forms the hypotheses are really about; they are about 
tµe proper attributes of the Forms Odd, Even, Square, Triangle, Acute Angle, 
etc. But the Form of the Good is the formal cause of the ideal attributes of 
these and all the other Forms. How then are we going to get entailment relations 
between the attributes of the Form of the Good and the proper attributes of these 
Forms. Further, the Form of the Good is the formal cuase of the being and essence 
of all the other Forms. Why than would the proper attributes of (some) mathema­
tical Forms be singled out for such deduction? And if they are not singled out, we 
would have deductions and entailment relations between the attributes of the 
Form of the Good and the proper attributes of other kinds of Forms, of, say, 
natural and artificial kinds, Living Creature, perhaps, or the Form Artifact, or 
the Form Planet, and so on. And in that case, what would the Form of the Good 
be? Instead of or in addition to being the very ideality of the Forms, it would 
also have to be, it seems, a conjunction of several Forms of diverse kinds, mathe­
matical, natural, and so on. I see no evidence that Plato thought of the Form 
of the Good in this way in our passages. It must be admitted of course that the 
idea of such a deduction is a powerful one, and probably is modeled on the 
deduction of theorems from hypotheses by the mathematicians: if the hypotheses 
are known, valid derivations of theorems will yield knowledge of such theorems; 
similarly, valid derivations of the hypotheses themselves from knwon things will 
yield knowledge of the hypotheses. Moreover, the influence of the Pythagoreans 
(who apparently tried to express even ethical concepts in mathematical terms), 
the high esteem in which Plato held mathematics, the high place of mathematical 
studies in the education of the rulers, and Plato's analysis of matter and the 
movements of the heavenly bodies in mathematical terms in the Timaeus, all these 
render general plausibility to the idea of some intrinsic connection of some 
mathematical Forms and the Form of the Good. All the same I doubt that this 
interpretation is correct. 
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But if it isn't, what is? It seems to me that the interpretation of 
the epistemology of the upper portions of the divided line has to be along the 
lines established in the second round. An obvious clue and a solid handle is 
provided by the idea of the second round that the Form of the Good is "the 
cause" of the knowability of the Forms. The sense we have given to this idea 
is that it is by virtue of their ideal attributes (Il and 12) that the Forms 
are knowable entities and that the Form of the Good is the formal cause of the 
other Forms' having their .real attributes. We have here clearly a theory as to 
what a knowable object is: to be knowable an object must be ungenerated, indes­
tructible, not subject to increase and decrease, must exist by itself (Il attri­
butes), and it must be always the same (or, must always be such and such, where 
"such and such" is a place holder for proper attributes), the same in every 
respect, the same no matter compared to what, and the same to everyone who appre­
hends it no matter from whre (12 attributes). This theory has at least one 
virtue: it is difficult to see how anyone who were acquainted (with the "mind's 
eye") with such entities would make a mistake about them; at any rate a whole 
set of mistakes due to variability and spatial location (in the case of physical 
objects) has been summarily excluded (though it is difficult to see how purely 
logical errors (as to what follows from what or what is entailed by what) have 
also been excluded). And this coheres well with the very strong distinction 
that what is drawn in Book V between knowledge and belief in terms of their powers 
and objects. Now this puts the dialectician in an epistemologically superior 
position to that of the mathematician. For unlike the mathematician he deals 
only with Forms: both in the "ascent" and "descent" to and from the Form of the 
Good, he begins, deals, and ends with nothing but Forms. Because of this and 
the nature of his objects he is assured freedom from error; at any rate, he is 
assured freedom from error as what his objects are, what the "immediate" proper 
attributes of each Form are, that is, attributes that a Form can be "seen" to 
have without recourse to inference. The mathematician� on the other hand, are 
at best in an ambiguous epistemological position. They deal both with Forms and 
with visible figures as images of the Forms; they talk about the visible figures 
but they are thinking about their models and making their points about them. 
Their hypotheses could be interpreted, by others perhaps, as being about their 
visible figures (applied mathematics presumably), or about their models. Insofar 
as their thought, their mathematical "intuitions", derive from the visible figures, 
they are not assured freedom from error (even though of course they may be making 
no actual error) as the dialecticians are. Plato says that they regard their 
hypotheses as known and obvious to everybody and give no account of them. What 
sort of "being known" and "obviousness" is he talking about? I think the "obvious­
ness" of the visible figures; it is the visible illustrations that would make the 
hypotheses "obvious to everyone", precisely the things that, in Plato's theory, 
could not make the hypotheses knowledge. And what sort of "account" is it that 
the mathematicians do not give of their hypotheses? I argued that he does not 
mean that they are underived; and I think he does not mean that they do not give 
definitions of the concepts they use, for surely they did construct definitions 
and Euclid's Elements (much later of course) begins with definitions. I think 
he means that they give not epistemological account of the sorts of objects 
they want their hypotheses to be about, not the visible figures, but their models. 
They do not, for example, ask themselves and seek to answer the question, What 
sort of objects must the objects our hypotheses are about be if our hypotheses 
are to be always true? They they have no theory of the objects their hypotheses 
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mu8t he about if they are to he always true and to constitute knowledge. 
B�caune of their practice of using sensible figures they are liable to error or 
at nny rate they are not assured freedom of error. Because of this practice 
they also are not in a position to �'see" the objects of their hypotheses "in 
splendid isolation" from sensible figures and begin to appreciate their nature. 
And also because, as mathematicians at least, they do not raise the above type 
·of questions, they lack a theory of objects proper to mathematics. The dialec-
tician, on the other hand, dealing only with Forms, has a chance to see their 
common nature, their nature as ideal objects possessing ideal attributes Il and 
12. And if he asks himself the perfectly Platonic question, In virtue of what 
do the Forms have these attributes in common?, presumably he will arrive at the 
conception of the Form of the Good. Looking downward from the Form of the Good 
the dialectician would see clearly what are Forms and what are not Forms; he 
would never make the mistake of confusing Forms with sensible instances, for he 
has now grasped the nature of the Forms, he has grasped the notion of what it 
is to be a Form. And if at any rate he has Plato's conception of knowledge, a 
cardinal tenet of which is that to be known an object must always be the same, 
etc., the dialectician would see that only the Forms are possible object of know­
ledge; and that if mathematics is to be knowledge, mathematical hypotheses must 
be about only such objects. Thus what the super science of dialectic would do 
for mathematics is not to provide a super general known basis from which mathe­
matical hypotheses (the beginning of mathematics) can be deduced, but rather a 
theory of objects that mathematical hypotheses (as well as the theorems) must be 
about if mathematics is to be knowledge. Such a theory would "free" mathematics 
from sensible figures in the sense that according to it the senstible figures 
are never evidence that the hypotheses are always true or known, but only images 
or illustrations or sensible participants of the objects the hypotheses are about. 
Plato's theory of Forms with the Form of the Good at the top serves mathematics 
by postulating the very objects that, according to Plato at least, mathematics 
needs to be about if it is to be knowledge. 
What is the moral of our story? I think it is that the theory of the 
Form of the Good in the Republic is truly and coherently the centerpiece of the 
canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato's meta­
physics, epistemology, ethics and politics, and even his theory of love and art. 
The Form of the Good serves his metaphysics by bringing into relief the very 
ideality of the Forms, the eternal order and stability of the entities that must 
exist if this world is not to be a "vast sea of dissimilarity." It serves his 
epistemology by bringing into relief the knowability of the Forms, the attributes 
the Forms must have if there is to be knowledge. The Form of the Good serves his 
ethics and politics, and even his theory of love and art, by bringing into relief 
the superlative goodness of the Forms, the features that must be imitated if the 
imitations are to have any value. In his theory of the Form of the Good Plato 
was truly the first grand philosophical synthesiser. If to achieve such a grand 
synthesis he had to employ a few unholy combinations, such as the combination of 
reality, goodness, and self-predication, he may perhaps be forgiven -- at least 
if he is understood. 
A minor moral, I hope, is that when Plato looked into "the orb of light" 
he really did see something. And it is a tribute, perhaps ironic, to his artistry, 
so evident in the three great similies, that when many others looked into the same 
orb of light through Plato's telescope they were warmed and elevated even though, 
apparently, they saw nothing. 
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and Plato has no real interest in defending the view that Forms are 
thoughts. What is more essential, do we have any evidence that Plato 
ever made the mistake of supposing that since sensibles participate 
in the Forms, . the sensibles have the ideal attributes of the Forms 
( a species of which is Keyt' s "since Forms are intelligivle entities 
and things share in Forms, each thing is an intelligible entity")? 
I think none; his whole ontology counts against making such a mistake. 
The closest he comes is the "eternity argument" discussed above;; 
and here his ontology -- 6f which the sharp contrasts between l4'orms 
and sensibles is a part-- saves him by forcing a distinction between 
eternity and everlastinghess(and this again in the special case of the 
cosmos). 
. A similar ooint . . " 23., J. is brought; ou.t by Vlastos in "A Metaphysical Paradox : "Only 
when Forms assume their other role, as objects of value, and the kind 
of value Plato claimed for them, would the self-charactization of Forms 
like Beauty have any point whatever." {p. 56). The notions of Forms 
SJS ideal exemplars, self-predi �tion, and· 'the Porm of the Good as 
the formal cause of the being and essence of the li'orms-- all these 
g·o hand in hand. In so far as Plato gave up non-Pauline self-predication 
in later dialo�es such a�. the .e_o2hist -- and the prominence of, 
such a Form as Change may have forced him to do it-- he would also 
be giving up, I think,. the. theory of the Form of the. Oood of the 
Republic. This would begin to account for his silence on the matter 
in later dialogues. Whether the theory is held in the Philebu.s seems 
more difficult to make out. 
24. These are relevant to the goodness of the shield since by varying
them we can affect how well the shield performs its function.
25. See, e.g. �ep. 479A, 479E, 484B,485B, 500C,585BD. In "An Ambiguity.
in the Sophist Vlastos finds ..  the· same.; and- Si!Jlilar phrases in the 
Philebus and the Timaeus (pp. 276-77). 
26. "The P19}Tchology of Justice in Plato" APQ, April, 1977, p. 15'4. I
am indebted to Cooper not on;I.y for his !liJlminati-ng rema_rks about the
Form of the Good (pp. 154- 5�� but also for giving me the courage
to try to think s.eriously about this difficult topic. Asidefrom the 
Notes (5) 
mathematical inte.rpretation of. tbeForm of the Good, some of Cooper's 
characterizations ·do .not appear consistent with the superl�tive goodness 
of kind of the other Forms (other th� the ·orm of the Good); for 
example the statement,"Every other good, being good only in some respect 
or relation or from some point oC view, is·also not so good, or even 
quite bad, in some other way." (154� This I think holds only of sensible 
goods, not the Forms.-
27. See, e.g. J. Adam, Th� Republic of Plato, 2nd Ed. D.A. hees,(1963),
to1.1.l, pp. 66-67; CoI11ford, .21?_.cit., pp. 6�'66; Ross, .2E..!_cit., pp. 54-55.
28. Adam, p. 67, Cbnnford, pp. 82-83, Ross, pp. 54-56.
